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The  preocnt  oitu~tion of  the  European Communities  gives rise 
to  great hopes  for  the  future  but  aloo  raises many  grave  problems. 
As  a  result  of  the  monetary  mc~s~res taken  b~ the  United 
States  on  the  15  August  1971,  the  Community  suddenly  found  itself 
faced  with  a  number  of  problems  concerning its institutions  for 
which  n  solution has  not  yet been ·found. 
T~is  ~ituation,  while  offering a  rare opportunity  to  the  EEC, 
also raises the  question of whether  the  Community  can bear  the  new 
strnins that  are  imposed  on it. 
The  EEC  is fnced  "'i th  the  probler:J  of undertaking a  number  of 
important  actions simultaneously,  it munt  : 
enlarge,  by  increasing the  number  of Nember  States  from  six to  ten 
- create  nn  economic  and  m6n.etary  union  and  r~.ssure ·for the  enlnrgcd 
Community  its place in the  world  to  which all the  peoples  of  the 
Member  States aspire. 
The  objectives of  the  EEC  hnvc  been  dofined  often  enough,  but 
unfortunately  they  do  not at this moment  present  the clear bold 
outlines that  arc  necensary.  On  1  and  2  December  1969,  the  Heads  of 
State  and  Government· of  the Six tried again to  for~ulate the  objec-
tives of  the  Community.  The  restrictive  ter.ins  of  the  final  communique 
o~ the  Hagu~ Conference  were  not  sufficient  ~or facing up  to  the 
unforeseen situation which  has arisen and  for  this reason  a  second 
summit  conference of the Heads  of State  i~ envisaged.1 
It must  be  decided whether  a  policy of  advance  by  cmall  stages 
·is sufficient  for  the  making  of  further  progress  or  whether it is 
necessary to  take  the big step  forward  wich is required  for  the 
solution of  the  many  accumulated  problems.  An  enlnrgorncnt  6f the' 
basis of  the  Treaty of Rome  in the  scnac  of  a  progress  going 
further  than  that of  integration as at present  envisaged is as 
1.  Declaration of Mr.  Malfatti,  the President  of the  Commiscion 
of European Communities,  on  19  August  1971. 
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necessary as  an  extension of the  engagements  of the Member  States 
to  give.,  from  the  legD.l  roint of  vie1rr,_  priority. to .Community 
political measures rather than  tg  measures  limited by national 
interests~ 
As  a  result  of  the  Conference  some  initial progress was  cado. 
As  early as April  1970,  the  Council  of Ministers had reached an' 
agreement,  in conformity with  ~he terms  of Article 201  of  the  EEC 
Treaty,  on  the  procedure  by  w~ic~ the  contributions of  the Member 
States would  be  replaced  p~ogrcss~vely by the Community's  own 
'1  resources  in order  to  ach.!.ore  fi  l'!rtucial  sovereignty  for  the  Community 
as well  as  the  definitive  finauci:1.g  of the  comr.10n  agricultural policy2. 
Negotiations with the  candidate  countries  for  adhesion were 
undertaken and  speeded up.  On  8 October  1970,  the  group  of  experts 
set  up  for this  purpoce  delivered their  11Interim Report"  to  the 
Council  and  to  the  Commission,  setting forth  the application by 
stages  of  economic  and  monetary unity  (Uerner Report).  The  Report 
envisages  three  stages  spread over  a  ten-year  period,  so  that  the 
final  stage  of  complete  economic  and  monetary union  could be  reached 
by  1980.  In this way  the  EEC  endeavoured  to  deal with  n  p~oblem 
which  should have  been  foreseen  when  it started developing in 1958. 
The  economic  nnd.monetary union  should be  obtained in the 
following  three  domains 
n)  economic  policy  ; 
b)  fiscal and  budgetary policy, 
c)  monetary policy. 
.;. 
1.  See  alco Newsletter  on  Common  Agricultural Policy N°  5  of April 1970a 
2.  See  also Newcletter  on  Common  Agricultural Policy N°  3  of March  197C. -3  ... 
X/827/72-E 
The  first  stage was  envisaged  for  the  years  1971-1973,  then 
after an  intermediary stage,  the  second  stage  for  1979  ;  'after 
which  a  now  conference  of tho  Headn  of G·overnments will decide 
.  . 
on  the  third and  final  stage.  The  Commi~sion also  examined  the 
Werner  Report  and  fixed priorities in its proposals. 
On  9  February,  the Council of Ministers  reached  ag:eeme~t 
although in a  regrettably limited measure,  especially as far as  the 
objectiv.cs  of  t~o first  stage wore  conqe._rned,  on .the  planninp; of 
stages in order  to  bring about  an  economic  and  monetary union. 
It is especially necessary to :Point put  the  existence of  a  ''safe-
guard  clause"  which  could become  a  new  obstacle .to progress unless 
-1  .•  '  • 
the  harmonization  of certain  economic  factors  concerning  the Member 
States  can  be  achieved. 
However,  as  a  whole,  th~ .ten year  plan  should be  respected 
even  though ·most  of  the  mnin  pro.'Qlcms  will arise during the  second 
half of that period. 
One  positive  factor which  should be  und~rlined was  the  joint 
.. 
intervention of  the  issuing banks in the  foreign  currency markets  ..  . 
which  had  been  decided  on as  a  part  of  the first  stage  and  which 
took  place  subsequently. 
On  25  March  1971,  the  Council  of Ministers was  able  to  ... 
~ I  • 
activate agricultural po:)_icy, . after a  long  period of stagnation, 
and  made  basic  proposals for  th'c  establishment of  a  structural and 
social policy for  Agricult~re ~~thin th~ Community.1 
These  basic  propos~ls werb  completed  on  the  26  May  1971,  by 
the  proposals of the  C~mmi~si6n concerning regional policies for 
agricultural aid for  areas which ·should bo  given priority.  All 
the~o resolutionn had  as objective  not  only the  reinforcement  of 
tho  Community  but  also its enlargement  at  the  same  time. 
.;. 
1.  See  Newsletter  on  Common  Agricultural Policy N°  2  of February 
1971,  and  N°  3  of March  1971  (and  N°  6  of  Juno  1971). -'1-
We  know  now  that  the  plan  drawn up  by  the  Council  for  the 
realization of an  economic  and  monetary union_ by  stages  must  be 
brought  into  force  rapidly and  consistnntly especially during  the 
first stage  to  avoid  the  ~isk of  the  Community  losing the 
ndvantages  \>Ihich  it has already acquired. 
The  role  o:f.....Q.&rj._cul tural pol:i;.2.Li-n  tho_g_~a~ion of  ~E-ropeo.n 
Cor:Jmunitiose 
In discussing political integration ·at the ·present  time it is 
Ae;ricul  ture \orhi.ch  comes  first  to  mind.  From  the·· point  of  view  of 
economic  policy.it is the  sector which is best integrated and  has 
closer tics with the  Community  thnn  any  of the  other  ~conomic 
sectors which the Treaty of Rome  had  envisaged  for  the  application 
of  a  common  policy. 
It is not  surprising,  therefore,  that  the  fcr.mers  are waiting 
for.o.  European political integration policy which will influence 
tho~e who  nrc  perhaps not  in favour  of a  common  agricultural policy 
but  who  have  made  no  efforts themselves  towards  progress in the 
domain of  an integrated political policy.  It is for  this reason 
that  farmers  are becoming  more  cin~  m~re restless and are  demanding 
that  the  European  Communi tics should ··quit  the  line of  one  way 
traffic for  political integration in which  they are  engaged  and 
undertake  complementary action in other  fieldso 
Such action must  be  taken rapidly if it is desired  that  the 
common  agricultural policy,  vihich is the  substance  of  integration, 
should survive.  Agricultural policy has  alrea6y  ~ade an  important 
contribution to  Europc~n integration bce;inninc with  the  financial 
solidarity -\-.rhich  tho  Member  States have  agreed  to respect  by  adopting 
all the measures relating to agricultural policy. 
This  solidarity has  served as  a  model  for  other Community 
regulations conceJ,:nine  finance  v1hich  nrc  envisaged  for  the  future. 
But  this financial  solidarity will also  be  endangered unless  a 
rapid solution to  the  present  monetary crisis can be  founde 
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The  agr,icul  tural market  has  set up  its proper  Cc,;:;Jrjuni ty 
institutions,  management  committees,  consultative  committees  and 
financing  funds,  all working in line  ~ith the orientation of  the 
policy of  the  Community.  Acricultural policy has·had  a  ~timula­
ting influence  on  foreign trade  policy and  the  harmonizatio~ of 
legislatio~s  •.. 
Agricultural policy exercises,  therefore,  a  strong influence 
on  the  efforts of  the  Community  a~ a  whole  but  to affirm that it 
represents  an isolated case  would  be  an  error. 
Oti  one  importan~ point,  agricultural policy  ha~ endeavoured 
to  look ahead by ~roviding its ow~ solutions in  ~he field of mone-
tary policy.  This brings to  mind  the ·question of the  E~ropean 
unit of account  which is in itself a  problOm  at this moment.  The 
·present  ~egociations on  economic  and  monetary unity. would not have 
had  such  far reaching implications within the  Community if a  common 
'  . 
agricultural policy and  the unit  of accound  had  not  existed.  On 
this problem  tl'le  Community  could  suffer a  serious setback.  It is 
for  this  reason that rapid progress must  be  made  now  tovmrds  inte-
gration in  ord~r not  to  lose  the benefits already obtained. 
Agricultural yolicy has  played an  important  part in the  construction 
of the  European  Communities  by  stimulating,  by its own  progress, 
integration in other  domains. 
The  false  "Gr'cen  Dollar" . 
The  "Green Dollar" is considered by  a  number  of politicians 
in agricultural circles and also  by  many  farmers  who  have  let 
themselves be  persuaded,  as  the  incarnation of all that is bad 
in the  Community.  Its positive aspects are hardly mentioned 
although it is an  instrument  for  the  fixing  and  expressing production 
prices vri thin the  Community  and  is a  safeguard  and , gunrant ce  of 
prices for  agricultural producers. 
The  unit of account is an  instrument  of  the agricultural 
policy of the  Community.  It was  introduced in the  common  asricultu-
ral policy of  the  EEC  in 1962  as  a  standard  for  the .fixing of agri-
cultural prices within the  Community. 
./. -&-
Tho  value  of  the  UA  is the  equivalent  of 0.889· gr.  of  fine 
gold. It corresponds,  at  the' m·oment,  to  the  value  of ·one  dollar. 
But  the parity of the  UA  is not" bas.ed  on  the parity UA-dolln·r  but 
on  the parity UA-gold.  The  only exactitude of  the  usual  o.rgumcnts 
against it lies in the  fact  that  the value  of  fine  gold  chosen 
for  the  UA  is the  same  as  the  value  of  the  American dollar. 
The  expression '"Green  Dolln."r."  is also  erroneous  an· it gives 
.. 
the  impression that the  value of  the  UA  is identical with and 
dependant  on the value  of  the  dollar which is.not the  case  .. 
Thus, _for  example,  the  suppression of·the unlimited converti-
bility of  tho dollar into  gold which·wao  announced by  the Americans 
on  15  Auguot  laot,  has in no  way  affected the  vaiue of the UA. 
The  value  of the  UA  will remain  unchanged while  the  parity  gold-UA 
in  not  modified.  This possibility cannot,  however,  be  excluded 
completely  depending  on  the  evolution of  the  sit~ation.  Th~ adoption 
of  the  EEC  regulation  N°  653/68  has  made  the  application of tho  inva-
riability of  the  UA  more  flexible in certain special cases.  According 
to  this regulation if one  or more.  of the  Mc.mber  States announce  a  mo-
dification in the  parity  ~f their currency,  tho  Council  of·Ministers 
of  the  European  Communities  may  decide,  unanimously,  to  modify  the 
parity gold-UA  and  decide  on  the  percentage  of  this modification. 
The  value  of  the  UA  can only be  modified automatically in 
certain special cases.  When  several countries modify  the parities 
of their currencies at  the  same  time  and  in the  same  sense,  the 
parity of  the  UA  can be  modified,  taking into  account  the  smallest 
modification in parity made.  No  decision to  modify  the  value  of  the 
UA  was  taken,  hovJcver,  v1hen  the  French franc  was  devalued nor  \-I hen 
the  German  mark  was  revalued in 1969.  Since  tho  agricultural prices 
are  fixed  for all the  Member  States in UA,  all the  equivalents in 
national currencieo  must  be  worked  out  on  the basis of the  rates 
which have  been  declared  to  the International Monetary Fund  (IMF). 
When  a  Member  Stafc modifies its  exchan~e rates  then  the 
. intervcntion_p_!'j._sc::_  to  be  paid in the  currency of  that  country is 
automatically adapted at  the  same  time. 
.;. 7 
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In the  case of a  devaluation,  the intervention price increases 
by  the  percentage of the  de.valuation. (e. g  .•  the  devaluation of the 
•  (  •• ••  t  • 
French  franc  in August  1969)  an~ in the .cas?  of a  revaluation they 
decrease  in the  same  p::o~ontion.(e~g. revaluation of ,the  German  mark 
in October  1969). 
This  automatism  guarantees,  in the  case of devaluation or 
revaluation,  that the level of the  joint agricultural prices  fixed 
by  the  Council of Ministers is.maintained,  but brings about,  howeve:r;, 
modifications in the levels. of national agricultural prices  (which  . 
are also linked Hi th  supra-.national obligations)  of the  state whictL  .  .  '  .  ·.  '  .  . 
has  devalued  or revalued its currency.  Qn,th~ other hand,. prices 
.  . 
of other national  goodo  and  services vrhich  nr~ not  ~ub  j ect  to  direct. 
obligations of this kind  remain unchanged. 
On  the level.of inter-community  commercial  exchanges  and  foreign 
trade,  revaluation brings about  an  increase in the  price of nqn-
'  i: '  .  . 
agricultural  goods  and  servi~es_in .an  exporter Member  State while 
a  devaluation brings about  a  diminution in the  prices of non-agricul-' 
tural goods  and  services. 
Any  modification in the  exchange rates introduced by a  Hembcr 
State resulting in modifications in the levels of its agricultural 
r·  • 
prices causes  a  disequilibrium of agricultural prices within the 
Member  States of  the  Community.  Decreases iri·prices  due  to revalua-
tion bring about  .an  immediate  decrease in agricultural rev"Qnuc  and· 
devaluation brines about  an increase in that  revenue. 
Although  the  UA  remains  unchanged,  the relation behreon the 
level of prices of  the Member  States ,\vhich has modified its pal'i ty 
and the  prices  of. the  Community  has  changed.  After  a  db~aluation, 
the agricultural producers of  the·country vrhich  has:devolued  obtain 
for  the sale of  a  product  a  higher  nomina~ price  than  that of the 
qther  countries,  while  a  revaluation. brings about  a  decrease  in · 
agricultural prices  expressed in the national currency.  However, 
the  variation in prices differs for  different products.  It corresponds 
to  the  rate of revaluation for  products  for  which  the intervention 
price has been  determined  on  the  Common  Market  but  tho  prices of other 
dependant  products are  also  influenced. 
./. - 'i?-
Important  repercussions' 
..  ~: 
The  changes in the- V'alu:e  ·of ··curre'ncies had. important· reper-
cussions within  the  EEC  'in ·1971·.  Although  the  common  agricultural 
· market  ~las principally·  affected~,  they also  prevented  tho  Community 
from  beginning  the  first  stage  towards  economic  and  monetary unity. 
For  information  i~ shotild be  recalled that 
1.;  France  devalued by  12.5 % on0August  1969·..  Tho  result  \-Tas  that 
the  French agricultural market  was  separated  from  the other  five 
agricultural mar'kets  because  of  the application of oxport  taxes  and 
subsidies :for imports  and  this until .1  August  1971,  \·:hen  France re-
turned to  the. price  system of the  Community. 
2.  On  29  September  1969,  the Gorman  Federal Republic  libernted 
exchange rates  provisionally~ Until 31  December  1969,  the  imports of 
agricultural· products of the  EEC  into  the  German  Federal  Republic 
were  submitted  to  import  taxds  so  that,  in fact,  the  common  market 
was  temporarily divided into three. 
Furthermore,  the German  farmers  are  to  receive,  for  a  period 
of  four  years,  compensatory  subsidies of  1.7 millinrd  DM  to  compen-
sate  them  for  the  losses  suffered. 
The  common  agricultural market  had  subsequently been stabilized 
with difficulty when it was  acain  shaken  by  the  events of .10  May  : 
On  this date  the  German  Federal Republic  again liber.ated the 
exchange  rates  for  the  DM  and  was  followed  by  the  Netherlands but 
at  a  different level.  Contrary to  fixed  changes  in e.xchange  rates 
co.uscd  by  devo.luation or  revo.lun.tiop.,  the  liberalization of  exchange 
rates is in complete  ~ontro.diction with the  measures  taken  for  fixing 
prices of agricultural products within the  framework  of  the units of 
account  system  which  can~ot permit  any  fluctuo.tion in  excho.nge  rates  • 
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With  the  introduction of  floating  exchange rates,  the rates 
vary  from  da.y  to  day  and  these  fluctuations  must  be  compensated 
by  taxes  imposed at  the  different frontiers,  worked  out  on  a  day 
to  dny basis,  in o·rder  to protect the  prices for  the  production of 
agricultural products ·fixed nt  Community  level,  against  the  fluctua-
tions arising out of  the  decisions•of Germany·and  the  Netherlands. 
The  Council has  agreed,  however,  that  com?ensatory taxes may  not be 
imposed at the  frontiers  with  a  view  to  protecting agricultural  · 
intervention prices except  when  the  fluctuations  of the official 
rate of the  DM  against  the  dollar  (1  American dollar =  3.66  DM) 
exceed 2.5 %.  This is what is called the level for  the  application 
of compensatory  taxes at  the  frontiers.  The  Council considered that 
.the. repe~cussions would  be  relatively insignificant \'Then  the rate of 
fluctuation remained  below  2.5 %.  The  compensatory tuxes are  to  be 
reviewed when  the  rate varies by  one  point  over  n  certain period. 
The  result of. the negociations  of  the  Council of  Mi~isters 
of Agriculture  and  the ded sian adopted  on  the  morning. of  12  Mdy 
signified  th~t tho  agricultural market,  once  again practically 
closed,  was  divided into three separate markets  : 
n)  The  German  Market, 
b)  The  Netherlands Market, 
c)  The  French,  Italian and Bclgo-Luxembourg Market  where  the  situation 
remained  normal. 
From  this moment  the  Community  agricultural market  found itself 
bnck  ag~in i~to  the'"trnnsition,ptac~ 6f  the  Treaty of Rome,  with  the 
reappearance  of  taxes at  the  frontiers of the Member  States of the 
Community  as  they  had.~xi~tcd until 1967.  b~ in the  cns6  of  some  pro-
ducts until 1968.  Back  to  a  system of inter-community taxation. 
The  Member  States with  floating  exchange  rates had  engascd  thcmsblves, 
however,  to  return to  a  system of fixed  exchange  rates based on  the 
previous  system  as  soon  as· possible. 
.;. -JC-
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In contrast with  the  mear.ures  taken by  the  Member  States on  . ) 
12  Mey  1971,  measures  which  were  based,  especially in so  far  as  the 
German  Federal Republic  was  concerned,  on  internal economic  necessi-
ties in order  to  avoid inflation.  On  15 August  1971,  the  qommunity 
had  to  face  new  outside monetary_difficulties arising from  the 
measures  adopted by the American  government  for  a  new  orientation of 
its monetary policy.  It became  apparent,  at least as  far  as internal 
policy was  concerned,  that  the  Community  was  not  sufficiently conso-
lidated to resist  such pressure  from  outside. 
The  protection measures adopted by  the Member  States were  in 
many  respects of a  different nature  and  although  they had  been 
approved  by  the  Community  had  no  communal  characteristics.  Luxem-
bourg  and Italy joined the  Member  States with  a  floatins currency 
and  who  had already liberated their  exchange  rates in relation to 
the  American  dollar  on  12  May. 
This  new  blovr  to  the monetary structure of  the  common  agricul-
tural market  meant  that  the  markets  of  tho Member  States were  obliged 
to protect  themselves  more  and  more  agai~st each  other.  This was 
necessary in order  to  protect agricultural production prices from 
fluctuations in foreign  exchanges  which  can only produce  devintions 
in the  flow  of agricultural products as had already been the  case  in 
1969.1  Since  1  August  1971,  French agriculture,  for which  certain 
special dispositions had  rem~ined in force  since  the  devaluation of 
the  fre.nc  in August  1969,  has  become  at;ain  an  intecrn.ted  and  complete 
member  of  the  Common  agricultural market.  This permitted the  suppressi~n 
of a  system of export  taxes  and  import _subsidies  Hhcn  at  the  same  time 
such  a  system  was  being  re-introduce~ by other Member  States. 
Italy which  has  also liberated its exchange rates has  not  yet 
employed  methods  of  compensatory  taxes at  the  frontiers  and  remains 
the  exception. 
./  .. 
1  ..  When  monetary  fluctuations  occur  and  in the  absence  of protection  ) 
measures,  agricultural products have  a  tcndancy to  flow  towards 
the Member  Countries whore  the  rate of  revaluation has been 
highest. .,,  ' 
·' 
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vlhile  on  12  May  1971,  the  eoinmon  ngriculturnl mnrkot  of the 
EEC  wns  divided into  three,  we  nrc  now  faced  with  n  market  thnt is 
divided into  four  components  : 
1.  Agreements  of  the Member  Stntcs with  other countries outside 
the  framework  of the  EEC. 
2.  ThcGcrma:fu.  agricultural mn.rkct. 
3·  The  Benelux  n.gricultural. mnrket. 
.  . 
4.  The  French ngriculturnl market, 
The  Itnlian agricultural mnrket. 
Since  the  12th.  Me.y,  the  Commission has regularly presented 
reports  on  the  conrrcquenccs  of  the  monetnry  situation on  the agri-
cultural markets.  -The  first tv-as  published on  14 June  1971  and  the 
fourth ;ms  submitted  to  the  Council  during i'ts  session· of 27  Sop- ·~ 
tember.  Furthermore,  on  that date  the  Commission  submitted  to  the 
Council  n  "rapport  sur los cpnsequcnces". 
This report underlined particularly the  grave  danger  that 
perturbation of the  ngricult~ral mn.rkct  could have  on  the  integration 
··policy of  the  Communi f:.y,  tnking into  account  the  monetnry  measures. 
adopted  by  the  Hember  States since  the  15th August. 
For  products  fOr  which  interv~ntion measures  have  been  ndoptcd, 
the  compensntory  payments  nrc  equ~l to  tho  ~ppl~cntion of pcrcentngc 
prices on the difference between  : 
- the  parity of  the  national  currency doclnred to the  Intcrnntionnl 
Nonetnry  Fund  and  recognized by  thnt  organization,,  f:l1J:d 
- the  arithmet-ical  averngc  of  the  rate of  exchange  (nft''dght)  of  the 
currency in question in relation to  the  American  dollar over  a 
determined  period.1 
-·----- .;. 
1.  Article  1  of  tho  EEC  regulations N°  97L:-/71. ~ampl..s.. :  soft  '>'rh.££! 
Period .§_t2_1.-S_Ma;y: _12_7..1 
- (")_-
are  calculated as  follows: 
(First  determinntion__qj.'_£_om_Re~to.!',L.P.ayments made  by  the  Cor.lmicsion) 
The  compensatory payments  for  a  Member  State are  due  -vrhcn  the 
percentage  fluctuation of itc currency reaches  2.5 % (Germnn  Federal 
Republic)  or 2%  (the Netherlands),  the  threshold for bringing 
compensatory meacures  into  operation. 
The  J:~.e!:.Y_e-;:J~ ~~. P.!'l.Q.£.  at  the  beginning of  the  period  nerves 
as  a  basis for  t~c  cal~ul~tion of the  compensatory  payments. 
COJ!).!!!.~:r:?.~.Sl.~.b:~~LE...ctween_t~_Com~i~Y n_p_d  t~_Germai_!_ Federa_~ 
R  oP.'.:.:.::. ':.'.:. 
IntelV8~tion price 1970/71 
396  {monetary fluctuation)  on 98.75  UA  = 
2.962  X 3.66  (official parity)  = 
Ir:.·i  ·~'  --::~:''·:·ton  price  1970/1971 
2 %  ~~o~c~n:y  fluctuat~on)  on 98.75  UA  = 
1.975  x  3.62  (offivi&l parity)  = 
98.75  /t 
2.962 
10.841  DM/t  compensatory 
paylncnt 
98.75 
1.975 
/t 
7.149 Fl/t compensatory 
payment 
For  the  calculntion of the  compensatory  payment  for  exchanges 
between  t~e  Ge~~~n Federal  Rep~blic and  the Netherlands  a  different 
meth~d m~st be  used  as  the  movement  of  the  two  currencies varies 
in relation to  the  American  dollar. 
Since  during  the  period 6  May  to  12  May  1971  the parity was 
1  Florin = 1  DM,  the  compensatory  payment  to  be  made  for  the  Nether-
lands has  only  to  be  substracted  from.the  compensatory  payment  of  the 
German  Federal Republic  to  obtain the  correct figure. 
.;. .. -13.- X/827/71-E 
.  :. 
Period 16.9  .. 7f t_o  22 •  .2_.71 
Example: soft \·rheat 
The  method  of calculations remains  the  same. 
Intervention price 19?1/?2  =  100.?2  /t 
100.72  . 8.2 % (monetary  fluctuation)  =  8.25904  /t  . 
8.25904 
100.?2 
5.13672  X 
X  3.66  (offidal parity of 
the  dollar)  =  30.2280  DM/t 
compcnsa:i:ory 
5.1  % (monetary fluctuation)=  5.13672 
3.62  =  18.5949 Fl/t,  compensatory  payment 
5.1  % (monetary  fluctuation)=  . 5  .. 136?2. 
50  =  256.8360  ,;t compe'nsatory  payment. 
Jla.yment 
These  calculations are  based on regulation 2050/71  of  the 
Journal Officiel of  the  European  Communities  NR- 217  of  the  27.9.71, 
in conformity with which  tho  co~pensatory payments  have  been 
calculated on  the  basis of the  following rates 
DM  8.2 
BFrs  and  FL.  (average)  5.1 X/827/71-E 
Period 16.9.71  to  2?~~71 
Tra~&h_s.o_llE..trl.e..E_~i  de_t~Cor.!}_!llun~_ty_ (five  days  money  market) 
from  Thursday  to Wednesday. 
Avernge  CIF  price  on  the world markets  as basis 
55.83  /t common  corn  8.2 %  ~ 4.75806  UA 
4.75806  x  3.66  (official parity)  = 
Compensatory  payment. = 16.70  DM 
!_.~therlands 
CIF  price =  55.83 /t common  corn 
55.83  :  5.1  % =  2.84733 
2.84733  x  3.62  (official parity) 
Compensatory  payment  =  10.30 Fl/t 
Be l.E..t.EE! 
CIF  price = 55.83 /t common  9orn 
55.83  :  5.1 % = 2.84733 
2.84733  x  50  (official parity) 
Compensatory  payment  = 142.30 BF/t 
= 
16.7556  DH/t 
10.3073 Fl/t 
The  compensatory  payments at  the  frontiers nrc based on  the 
effective dates  of  import  or  export.  The  importer  must,  therefore, 
be  prepared  to  pay  on  the  date  of import  an  amount  in excess  of 
that which he  had  calculated in the first place.  This  problem 
can  only interfere with  commercial  exchanges  in the  long run. 
As  tho  examples  cited nbove  show,  it is  cle~r that  compensa-
tory payments  have  shown  a  rising trend since  10  May  last.  The 
compensatory payments  due  at  the frontiers are re-calculated each 
time  that  tho  divergence  in  exchange  rates rises by  one  point  • 
.  ;. -15- X/827/71-E 
This point  haB  already been. undc'rlined in the  cx~mplc gi  von 
for  the  period 23  to  29  September.  During  this period the  exchange 
rates had  already  exceeded 
9.4  for  the  DM 
· 6.5  for Florins and Belgian francs  (average). 
A new  calculation was,  therefore,  necessary. 
Official rates of  the  6.10.1971  -- ___  ._.......__  Francfurt  m-mie·y  market 
1  American  dollar =  3.3170  German  marks  :::  10~34 % revaluation 
1 American dollar  =  5-3760  Frenr.-h  francs  :::  3.31  % revaluation 
1  American dollar  =  46.91  Bclg::n.n  francs =  6.59 % revaluation 
1 Americo..n  dollar  =  3·3624 Florins  ~  7~66 % revaluation 
1  American dollar = 611.65  Itnl  ..  Lire  =  2.18  7&  revaluation 
The  revaluntion rate of  the  DM  during  the  first week  of October 
had  already passed  the critical point  of  10  %  which  gave rise to  a 
state of  crisis in the  common  agricultural market  and  in the policy 
for  agricultural prices. 
Tuxes at  the  frontiers have  reached recently the lcvel·of those 
of 1966,  before  the  creation of a  nystem  of  free  circulo..tion of agri-
c~ltural products within the  EEC,  o..nd  have  now  reached the level of 
taxes  of  19$2.  T~e Ministers of AGriculture  examined  the  situation 
of  27  and  28  September 1971,  after the  failure  of the session of  the 
Council  of Finance  Nin:i.rl:c~s  of  19  ,\,!gust  1971  and  the  restoration, 
more  apparent  than real,  of  a  united monetary front  for  the Six 
decidod  on by  the  Finance Ministers  on  13  September. 
The  Ministcrq  of Agriculture  have  insisted that  a  rapid solu-' 
tion of monetary  problems  must  be  found  and  they reaffirmed the  .  . 
principles of freo  circulation of  goods  botvrcen  the  countries of 
the  Community,  common  prcf~renccs lor the agricultural producto 
of  tho  Community  in reciprocal  traclc  and  fine.ncial  solid'ari  ty  • 
.  /. The  fact  that not  one  of the  governments  of  the  Hember  States 
of the European Communities is satisfied with the  evolution of the 
situation at  the  present  time  can be  considered  as  a  positive  element. 
An  inflationary disequilibrium has  existed within tho  Community  for 
tho last three  years  and  the  Hembcr  States have  not  undertaken adequate 
measure  for  the  formation  of a  common  front  against  these inflation&ry 
tendencies.  In  so  far  as medium  term  economic  policy is concerned, 
the  objectives of  the  Community  have  only been  taken into  consideration 
to  a  very small  extent.  It was  precisely at the  moment  when  the  desira-
bility of taking action on  these  lines became  apparent  that the: present 
serious crisis arose. 
"The  set-back of 9  May  will have  repercussion on  national  econo-
mic  thinking for  a  long time".1 
Although it is fully understood  that  "united,  even  the weakest 
arc  powerful" it should alr;o  be  remembered  that  "a bow-string which 
is stretched too  tight vrill break". 
The  measures  taken by  the Americans  force  the  Community  to 
take  common  decisive action immediately  &nd  on  the lines laid down 
by  the  initial objectives. 
vJhat  is urgent  and  absolutely indirrpensablc is a  Community 
decision on 'a  rapid return to  fixed  exchange rates.  Each  Hember 
State must  play its part in facing  the  problem  on  a  Community  basis. 
The  countries of tho  EEC  must  fix realistic parities between  their 
currencies. 
From  o.n  international point  of  vie1:r,  the real problem is the 
deficit in the  balance  of  payments  of  the United States.  This 
deficit in the  balance  of  payments  cannot,  however,  be  covered in 
a  few  months,  on  the  contrary it will certainly remain  a  fact  for  a 
very long time  closely linked as it is with many  other  important  · 
problems. 
----·----·  .;. 
1.  Rainer Hellmann  :  11Europnischo Gcmeinschaft",  N°  10/1971, 
pngc  16,  Bonn  liaison office of  the  European Communities. ,  I  •..  X/827/71-E 
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This is why  the  Community  r.mst  tc:.kc  action  ir.u:1cc'i :tt 0ly if it 
does  not wish to  become  the  victim of  events which  arc  working against 
its development  and  v1hich  indeed  are  not  directly connected with its 
organization. 
The  Community  must  take  protective measures againd speculative 
movement  coming  from  outside.  The  new-born  Community  system must  not 
be  allowed  to  collapse under  pressure  from  outside forces.  The  Commu-
nity must,  therefore,  seek a  definite and lasting solution to  the  pro-
blem,  a  solution vrhich  cannot  be  questioned  from  one  day to  another  as 
has  happened  in the past.  A  decision at  Community  level must  be taken 
during  the  coming months. 
This  decision  could  form  n  platform,  from  the political point 
of view,  for  the  creation by  the Six of an organized caoperation per-
mitting the  negociation of definitive regulations which  would  not  be 
unilatcrc:.lly unfavourable  to  any of  tho  contracting parties.  It is 
certain that  the  final  solutions will be  accompagnied  by  a  p~ound 
modification of  the  economic  and  monetary  systems  of  tho  whole  world 
and this gives  the  Community  the opportunity to  play its part in the 
establishment  of  a  bctter internationnl  equili~rium. 
The  strengthening of  the  common  agricultural market  must  be 
the  centre of these preoccupations  as it is indispensable  as  a  factor 
of  equilibrium and  stability.  Before  the  end  of March  1972,  the  Coun-
cil of Ministers  should be in a  position to  decide  on  the prices for 
agricultural products for  the  period 1972/1973  and  the progressive 
suppression of taxes at  the  frontiers. 
The  UA  Must  be  transformed into  a  real instrument  of  the  Commu-
nity1  independent  of  forces  acting  on it from  outside  the EEC.  The 
new  UA  should be  supple  enough  to  preserve  the  farmers  of one  or 
other of  the  Hember  States nge.inst  prejudices "'hich  may  arise  from 
certain quarters.  In this way  the  UA  cnn  become  a  positive  facto~ 
in the pursuit of  the  full development  of  the  Community  and will 
quiclcly  cease  to be  regarded as  a  perturbing clement as it has  been 
considered by  many  on  numerous  occasions  during  the last  hro  years. 
In the  present  situation, all the  Member  States have  marked 
their approval  for  the  finding of a  common  solution  ••••  but  words 
must  give  place  to  action now. 